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TOWARD AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF FIRST AND 
SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION* 
Moira Chimombo 
It is never sufficient simply to analyze without synthesis, 
or for that matter to synthesize without analysis. Ironically, 
that is as true of language acquisition itself as it is of the 
research that describes it. Yet researchers cannot synthesize 
until they have analysed sufficient quantities of data, just 
as children cannot synthesize until they have had sufficient 
input (begging the question of what constitutes sufficient 
data or input). 
Researchers in second language (L2) acquisition have 
now, however, reached a stage of theory building that has 
been possible only as greater quantities of data became 
available. In the field of L2 acquisition, we have only now 
begun seriously to consider the possible universals of L2 
acquisition from a theoretical p·erspective, yet Stobin was 
already discussing universals of first language (Ll) acquisition 
in 1968.l Dulay and Burt led the field with their view of 
L2 acquisition as creative construction, which was first 
posited in the mid 1970s2 but was constantly restated and 
modified. One of their later definitions .of creative construc-
tion was the following: 
the process by which learners gradually 
reconstruct rules for speech they hear, 
guided by innate mechanisms which cause 
them to formulate certain types of 
hypotheses about the language system 
being acquired until the mismatch between 
what they are exposed to and what they 
produce is resolved.a 
This is remarkably similar to Brown and Hanlon's view 
of L 1 acquisition: 
We suspect that the only force toward 
grammaticality operating on the child 
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is the occasional mismatch between his 
theory of the structure of the language 
and the data he receives. 4 
Overgeneralizations are one piece of evidence for the 
hypotheses learners formulate and then try to test against 
the input they receive. Attempts to account for the resolution 
of the mismatch in L2 acquisition or learning have included 
the Monitor Model5 and the Pidginization Hypothesis.6 These 
have, so far, been unable to provide complete explanations 
of any one individual's success or failure as a language learner. 
In spite of Krashen1s7 caution against adopting theories 
from other fields to account for L2 acquisition, w-c do need 
to look outside the field of L2 acquisition, not only into 
Ll acquisition but also into related fields within developmental 
psychology. Theories of human development such as that 
of Piaget,8 thought out over a lifetime of research, should 
provide us in a relatively new field with a starting point 
which unfortunately has all too often been ignored. We 
can even go beyond theories or human development to gain 
deeper insights into the process of language acquisition. 
Let us consider very briefly the parallels of Dulay and 
Burt's definition of creative construction9 with the Piagetian 
view of how development comes about. Piaget isolated 
two universal properties of sentient organisms which are 
functionally invariant: organization and adaptation.10 The 
latter property has two components: assimilation and 
accommodation. Assimilation is the process of changing 
the world to fit the self, while accommodation is the proceS& 
of changing the self to fit the world. The one does not happen 
without the other, although the relationship between the 
two may vary q11ite considerably from event to event. 
Organization may be related to Dulay and Burt's mention 
of the learners reconstruction of rules.11 Assimiliation and 
accommodation are the processes by which the learner 
resolves the mismatch between his language input and output, 
as Karmiloff-Smith12 and Hakuta13 pointed out for Ll and 
L2 acquisition respectively. Overgeneralization is one of 
the processes by which assimilation is achieved prior to 
accommodation. 
It is often forgotten that Piaget's theory was an attempt 
to account for the development of logical operations in 
the child, how the child becomes the scientist. lf Piaget's 
theory can explain some of the processes of language acquisi-
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tion, can we not then vie.w the child not only as a linguist 
or ethnographer14 but as a scientist? Dulay and Burt talk 
of hypothesis form ulation.15 Hypothesis formation and 
hypothesis testing are the activities that build science. 
In order to evaluate the view of the child as scientist, we 
look in some detail at Kuhn's analysis of how science is done,16 
before relating the results of studies of overgeneralization 
in language acquisition to a view of language acquisition 
analogous to scientific research. Kuhn's analysis at the 
societal level parallels W1ite closely Piaget's analysis at 
the level of the individual.I 
Paradoxically, as was mentioned at the beginning of 
this paper, analysis and synthesis (or assimilation and 
accommodation) are as necessary a part of language 
acquisition itself as of the research that examines it. 
Paradoxically, too, Kuhn's analysis applies as well to the 
state of theory building within· the field of L2 acquisition 
as it does to the process of language acquisition itself. 
First, we have to discuss Kuhn's use of the word paradigm. 
Kuhn does not give just one definition of the word, but many. 
One can only gain an understanding of his meaning by 
extracting from the many uses of the term. As a body of 
socially accepted scientific theory, a paradigm provides 
the basis for normal science (that is, the daily research 
of scientists). It is the tool for the socialization of scientists-
to-be. A paradigm defines the problems which are to be 
examined and the rules and methodology for solving those 
problems, and also excludes the problems which are to be 
ignored. "Paradigms guide research by direct modeling 
as well as through abstracted rules11.18 But, while nature 
does not fit exactly any paradigm, "measurements taken 
without a paradigm •.• seldom lead to any conclusions at 
all".19 
As we mentioned, a paradigm provides the basis for 
normal science. Normal science only begins when a paradigm 
has been universally accepted. Prior to this, the science 
is preparadigmatic, with many competing paradigms. 
Kuhn's main concern was to describe how science 
progresses, how new paradigms emerge. Normal science 
is concerned not with changing paradigms but with 
investigating the facts that the paradigms show to be 
particularly revealing of the nature of things20, comparing 
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facts with predictions based on the paradigm theory,_ and, 
gathering facts in order to articulate the theory. However, 
paradigms never define all the problems and all the solutions. 
Inevitably anomalies appear, indicating a crack in the theory. 
These anomalies are not at first treated as counterinstances. 
In order to recognize and accept the novel, in order to realize 
that something has gone wrong, one has to know what was 
expected. Furthermore, anomalies are not recognized until 
an alternative candidate as paradigm is available which 
accounts for the anomalies in addition to everything that 
was accounted for by the original paradigm: 
The decision to reject one paradigm is 
always simultaneously the decision to 
accept another, and the judgement leading 
to that decision involves the comparison 
of both paradigms with nature and with 
each other.21 
Not all anomalies give rise to new theories and 
subsequently new paradigms, only those "whose characteristic 
feature is their stubborn refusal to be assimilated to existing 
paradigms.11 22 Serious anomalies lead to a "proliferation 
of versions of a theory1123 which is symptomatic of crisis. 
Finally, one version becomes accepted, and the crisis is 
resolved, after a scientific revolution. 
The transition from crisis to new paradigm is not merely 
additive, it involves radical change: 
Assimilating a new sort of fact demands 
more than an additive adjustment of theory, 
and until that adjustment is completed 
- until the scientist has learned to see 
nature in a different way -the new fact 
is not quite fact at all.24 
Kuhn quotes Butterfield as describing the reorientation 
required after a paradigm shift as: 
picking up the other end of the stick, 
"a process that involves handling the same 
bundle of data as before, but placing them 
in a new system of relations with one 
another by giving them a different 
framework. 1125 
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Once the revolution has occurred, there is a return to the 
activities of normal science, and the process starts again. 
To summarize, Kuhn views the progress of science as 
involving essentially three stages: (1) pre-paradigmatic 
science, when there are a number of competing paradigms 
- none is universally accepted by the scientific community; 
this stage ends with the acquisition of a paradigm; (2) normal 
science, when the accepted paradigm is articulated, the 
significant facts are defined, the facts are matched with 
the theory, and the theory becomes increasingly precise 
through puzzle-solving activity which leads to the discovery 
of anomalies; and (3) scientific revolution, when the old 
paradigm is rejected as a result of the anomalies and a new 
one is sought. 
Where lies the parallel with language acquisition? First, 
we consider the broad implications, and then the narrower 
ones. A language can be viewed as a paradigm in that, in 
terms of the speech community in which it is spoken, 26 
it is a body of socially accepted "theory", and .it sets the 
limits of the problem to be solved. Language, like scientific 
knowledge, is intrinsicall~ the common property of a group 
or nothing else at all.2 If a paradigm is a means for 
socializing future members of the community, then language 
acquisition viewed as socialization28 is the acquisition of 
a paradigm. 
Now, where lies the parallel with patterns of over-
generalization in language acquisition? The target language 
paradigm is only acquired over a long period of time, during 
which the language learner for ms his own personal 
paradigms.29 Overgeneralizations reveal the acquisition 
of a personal paradigm. To demonstrate this, we review 
briefly the broad stages in the linguistic marking of a semantic 
notion in studies of overgeneralization.30 First we find 
a few instances of correct usage, but reduced utterances 
or unanalysed prefabricated patterns rather than fully 
understood linguistically complex utterances. Errors coded 
during the first stage are either random or only temporary, 
but not precursors of future errors. In the second stage, 
there is evidence of the generation of a hypothesis independent 
of the prefabricated patterns. This hypothesis often results 
in correct utterances in a limited number of cases at first. 
But then overgeneralization begins as the one hypothesis 
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is applied to all instances of use of the particular syntactic 
form. Toward the end of this stage of overgeneralization, 
there is the beginning of an awareness of error, as evidenced 
by random or temporary errors which are precursors of what 
is to come. Then comes the crisis point, when a great number 
of errors reflect the realization that the hypothesis does 
not fit the data at all and that alternatives have to be tried. 
Finally the crisis is resolved, at least for one problem, but 
the cycle has to be repeated for each new paradigm.31 
There is a remarkable parallelism between these stages 
in the acquisition of language and the stages in the develop· 
ment of new paradigms in science. The first stage, in which 
there are random or temporary errors only alongside the 
use of prefabricated patterns, reflects the absence of a 
paradigm. Then the first hypothesis is formulated and tried 
out, correctly at first, alongside the prefabricated patterns. 
This stage is pre-paradigmatic, ending in the acquisition 
of a paradigm. Prior to this point, overgeneralization is 
impossible, because overgeneralization reflects the presence 
of rules embodied in a theory. A paradigm is a prerequisite 
to the discovery of laws.32 Then overgeneralization becomes 
widespread as the facts are gathered and inv,estigated, to 
be compared with predictions based on the hypothesis. The 
paradigm guides the research by direct modeling and 
abstracted rules. 33 However, anomaliei:i begin to appear, 
reflected in more random errors which evidence an attempt 
to find the correct solution. At this point, there is no 
alternative paradigm. Only when an alternative paradigm, 
a new hypothesis, has been found car, the crisis be resolved. 
But the new paradigm only solves part of the problem so 
the whole cycle is started again, with ever greater refinements 
as one paradigm replaces another. The order in which the 
problems are resolved and the structures are acquired may 
be related to the importance of the perceived anomalies: 
only those "whose characteristic feature is their stubborn 
refusal to be assimilated to existing paradigms" give rise 
to new theories. 34 Furthermore, since "assimilating a new 
sort of fact demands more than an additive adjustment of 
theory", 35 we still find the random error which is a hangover 
from the old paradigm, and the selfcorrections representing 
shifts from the old to the new paradigm within one utterance. 
While this parallelism may be appealing, it is important 
to see where other theories might fit in. We first examine 
Schumann's Acculturation model.36 Schumann emphasizes 
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the importance of viewing L2 acquisition as socialization 
into the L2 community (cf Vygotsky on Ll acquistion),37 
just as Kuhn emphasizes the importance of scientists being 
socialized into the scientific community. Schumann developed 
his model in an attempt to account for the fact that some 
learners, who evidenced limited syntactic development, 
never seemed to reach the presumed goal of target usage 
of the L2, in other words ne.ver acquired the L2 paradigm. 
His explanation was in terms of the social and psychological 
distance of the learners from the L2 community. He saw 
parallels between L2 acquisition and the development of 
pidgins along a pidginization-creolization continuum, in 
terms of both linguistic and social features. Pidgins may 
be seen as pre-paradigmatic in Kuhn's terms, while creoles 
may be "normal science." Andersen expanded on Schumann's 
evolving model, relating the L2 acquisition continuum not 
only to the pidginization-creolization continuum but also 
to the creolization-decreolization continuum.38 In the move 
toward decreolization, we see a paradig'm shift. We can 
relate Andersen's revision of Schumann's model to the 
schematic representation in Figure 1, expanded to show 
parallels with Kuhn, Piaget, and the stages in the acquisition 
of negation found in Chimombo's studies of 
overgeneralization. 3 9 
It appears that in the initial stage of language a.cquisi-
tion, only random and temporary errors occur due to the 
absence of a norm: the language learner cannot have a norm 
until he has some data. In L2 acquisition, one reason for 
the finding that overgeneralization does not begin until 
Stage III, while in Ll acquisition it begins in Stage II, 40 
may be that the learner has first to prepare himself to shift 
from the Ll to the L2 norm, prior to establishing the 12 
norm in Stage II. Such an interpretation is validated by 
studies like Taylor1s41 in which it has been found that 12 
learners initially evidence a greater amount of Ll inter-
f erence (or interlingual overgeneralization as we prefer 
to call it) but then increasingly produce more intra-lingual 
overgeneralization errors, as the 12 norm becomes established. 
Acquisition toward an internal norm is only evident when 
intra-lingual overgeneralization errors begin. Once 
disconfirming evidence for the original hypothesis leading 
to these overgeneralization errors is found, then begins 
acquisition toward an external norm. Interesting confirmation 
of the process of lessening overgeneralizations and increasing 
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differentiation of syntactic markers as being acquisition 
toward an external norm comes from Chimombo's data on 
the relationship of overgeneralized utterances to preceding 
utterances in the discourse context. 42 At the height of 
overgeneralization, when another's utterance provides a 
model, this model is modified to fit the current hypothesis. 
Only when overgeneralization is coming to an end is complete 
and accurate imitation of another's utterance possible. 
This brings us to the question of where Krashen's Monitor 
Model fits in. 43 The Monitor Model is related to Krashen's 
distinction between informal language acquisition and formal 
language learning. 44 Krashen claims that learning is used 
only as a conscious Monitor, while acquisition may or may 
not serve as a conscious Monitor but does not preclude 
unconscious monitoring. Acquisition is central. Learning 
is limited in three ways: (1) with respect to individuals 
- not everyone uses the Monitor in performance; (2) with 
respect to rules - learning may be applicable only to a small 
subset of the grammar; and (3) with respect to the situation 
- the Monitor is not used everywhere. Krashen gives 
examples of Monitor under-users who appear to have no 
conscious rules at all, and monitor ovel'-users, whose rules 
are so conscious that rather than make errors they remain 
silent, as well as optimal Monitor users, who make the best 
use of conscious rules to produce correct target language 
output.45 
When we examine the results of Chimombo's studies, 46 
we find clear examples of the Monitor being used in acquisi-
tion, when the child code-switches or corrects himself. 
However, it is not until a paradigm has been acquired and 
is being tested, in the stage of overgeneralization, that 
awareness of error becomes evident.47 This suggests that 
the Monitor, the conscious application of rules, cannot come 
into operation prior to the acquisition of a personal paradigm. 
While maintaining the Monitor, we therefore suggest 
that it is not so much the distinction between acquisition 
and learning per se that is the key to use of the Monitor, 
but rather differences in two other factors: perception 
and socialization into the speech community. We have already 
mentioned the importance of socialization in language 
acquisition, so let us look now at the related question of 
perception. The Monitor can only come into operation when 
an error has been perceived. But as Forsdale says: 
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Each of us uses three selective processes 
in communication: selective attention 
or exposure, selective perception, and 
selective memory or retention. We attend 
to communication that interests us or 
meets our needs, tuning out communication 
that doesn't; we perceive communication 
in ways congruent with our assumptions 
and needs; we remember communication 
that serves our assumptions and needs. 48 
Socialization to some extent dictates the operation of these 
selective processes. We saw how Kuhn emphasized the need 
for a paradigm, a tool for socialization into the scientific 
community in order to discover new laws. Hut a paradigm 
can be both a help, in memorizing the known, and a hindrance, 
in perceiving the anomalies. Kuhn gives many examples 
of the effects of selective attention and selective perception 
and how discoveries in science have been made as a result 
of shifts in perception. One example is the discovery of 
oxygen: Priestley had prepared the way for Lavoisier to 
perceive an anomaly in the phlogiston theory. But Lavoisier's 
work on oxygen gave him a structure to his perception: 
It told him a thing he was already prepared 
to discover. • •• ·That advance awareness 
of difficulties must be a significant part 
of what enabled Lavoisier to see in 
experiments like Priestley's a gas that 
Priestley had been unable to see there 
himself. Conversely, the fact that a major 
paradigm revision was needed to see what 
Lavoisier saw must be the principal reason 
why Priestley was, to the end of his long 
life, unable to see it.49 
As that example shows, there is often great resistance to 
novelty, an inability to perceive it in spite of recognition 
of anomalies. In fact, Kuhn adds later, "Almost always 
the men who achieve these fundamental inventions of a 
new paradigm have been either very young or very new to 
the field whose paradigm they change1150 because once we 
perceive something complex: in one way, on the basis of 
one paradigm, we have great difficulty in shifting our 
perceptions to perceive it differently, on the basis of a new 
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paradigm. Clark observed such a resistance to novelty in 
the study of language development and concluded that "far 
from being an essential tool, a theory may be a handicap. 1151 
However, we must remember Kuhn's warning that unless 
we operate within a theoretical framework, we will not 
come to any conclusions. 
Perhaps one reason why children are often more success-
ful L2 learners than adults is that their Ll paradigm is less 
entrenched so they are less resistant to the novelty of tne 
L2 paradigm. But Kuhn also points out that at times of 
crisis, or approaching paradigm shift or scientific revolu-
tion, there is a prolif era ti on of different versions of a theory 
accompanying intense concentration on the problems, just 
as Chimombo found in the patterns of overgeneralization 
immediately prior to acquisition of the target negative 
form.52 An important aid to the perception of anomaly 
and to consequent perception of novelty is this intense 
concentration, intense activity, intense input. ' This suggests 
that the most necessary ingredient · in successful L2 
acquisition, in which the Monitor can be used appropriately 
to aid acquisition toward an external norm, is intense input, 
most especially in the earliest stages when the learner has 
to shift from a Ll to a L2 norm, or in Kuhn's terms to 
experience a paradigm shift. Without this intense input 
learners will be unable to see patterns, to generate hypotheses, 
and thus acquisition toward an internal norm is impossible. 
But in later stages they will also be unable to test their 
hypotheses without sufficient input. To get this input, they 
need to be active members of the appropriate language 
community. It seems that socialization is a prerequisite 
to perception, in language acquisition as in science. 
*I would like to express my gratitude to the Scandinavian 
Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, where I 
prepared this paper while a guest researcher. 
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